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Farm level impact of rural development policy: a conditional 
difference in difference matching approach 
Salvioni C. and Sciulli D.  
 
Abstract 
We use a conditional difference-in-difference matching estimator and a 2003-2007 balanced 
panel drawn from the FADN Italian sample to evaluate the impact at the farm level of the 
implementation of  the first Italian Rural Development Programme (RDP). 
We find that, in average, farms receiving at least a RDP payment increased family labor, while 
they did not increase total labour employed on farm. In addition, they experienced an increase 
in labor profitability and added value, even though the estimate significance varies accordingly 
to the matching method used. Our findings, suggest that the implementation of the first RDP 
produced a positive direct impact on rural GDP, while it did not prove to be effective in terms 
of rural employment growth. 
 
Keywords:  Common  Agricultural  Policy,  Rural  Development  Policy,  conditional  diff-in-diff 
matching 
 
JEL classification: Q12, Q18, C14.  
1.  INTRODUCTION  
The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  assess  the  impact  at  the  farm  level  on  several  relevant 
variables, namely on-farm structural and economic performance indicators, of the first Italian 
Rural Development Programme (2000-06 period).  
Starting from the reform of the Structural Funds (1988), when a system of monitoring and 
evaluation in EU regional policies (OECD, 2009a) was originally introduced, the evaluation of 
EU activities has grown importance over time and it now forms an integral part of the policy 
process.  
The  principal  aims  of  these  various  evaluations  may  be  characterized  as  supporting 
decision-making,  improving  the  implementation  of  policy  measures,  assisting  in  resource 
allocation and enhancing accountability and transparency of public policies (OECD, 1999; EC, 
2006).  
The evaluation of the Rural Development programmes was initially supported from the 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (1999) and later from the Handbook on 
Common Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (CMEF) (EC, 2006). The CMEF acts as a 
guide for the evaluation of rural development polices in the programming period 2007-2013.  Ancona - 122
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The  CMEF  evaluation  approach  employs  a  hierarchy  of  indicators  combined  with 
evaluation questions (CEQs)
1, often used for EU-wide policy programmes. A major drawback 
of the CMEF approach is that, given the heterogeneity of rural areas in the EU, some CEQs bear 
little relevance to the circumstances of particular Member States or regions. In such cases, there 
is a danger that answers given are of poor quality or doubtful validity. As a consequence, the 
question  arises  whether  alternative  evaluation  approaches  can  be  used  to  evaluate  the 
effectiveness of rural development measures, i.e. the outcome in relation to the objective(s) of 
the measure, in specific environments.  
In addition to this, alternative methods can be of help in evaluating the impact of RDP or 
of single measures, i.e. the net effect or changes on specific variables at the farm or territorial 
level.  In  an  impact  assessment  study,  one  of  the  most  difficult  issues  is  the  possibility  of 
selection biases. This problem occurs because we would like to know the effect of a treatment, 
in this case the participation in a RDP, on the participant farms’ outcome but cannot observe the 
outcomes with and without treatment on the same individual farm at the same time. Simply 
comparing mean outcomes may not reveal the actual treatment effect, as participants and non-
participants typically differ even in the absence of treatment (Caliendo and Kopeining, 2008). 
For example, farmers participating to a scheme may differ systematically from non-participating 
farmers and the above simple mean comparisons may reflect differences in their characteristics 
rather than the impacts of participating in the programme. In other words, failure to account for 
treatment selection biases may lead to biased estimation of the true treatment effect. 
A  few  empirical  studies  have  been  looking  at  the  impact  of  farm  and  rural  policy 
programmes  controlling  for  the  non-random  assignment  of  subjects  to  treatment,  and  the 
selection bias (Lynch and Liu, 2007; Lynch, Gray, and Geoghegan, 2007; Pufahl and Weiss, 
2009; Chabé-Ferret and J. Subervie, 2010).  
This paper aims to contribute to the literature by providing a micro perspective on the 
impact of the participation of farms in the first Italian rural development programme on farm 
employment and profits.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two provides overview 
about the EU rural development policy and its implementation in Italy. Section three presents 
the data and the propensity score matching (PSM) method, i.e. the semi-parametric econometric 
approach used to compare the performance of farmers participating and non-participating to the 
first Italian RDP (2000-2006) by accounting for their inherent differences. Section four presents 
the estimation results and in section five conclusions are drawn 
 
                                                       
 
 
1 According to the guidelines in the CMEF handbook (EC, 2006), data for about 160 indicators (of which 83 output indicators, 12 
result indicators, 7 impact indicators, 36 objective related baseline indicators and 23 context related baseline indicators) have to be 
collected and analysed and nearly 140 common evaluation questions (CEQs) have to be answered.  
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2.  BACKGROUND 
2.1.  The EU´s Rural Development Policy 
The EU´s rural development policy evolved from a policy dealing with the structural 
problems of the farm sector to a policy addressing the multiple roles of farming in society and, 
in particular, challenges faced in its wider rural context. 
Agenda  2000  established  rural  development  policy  as  the  second  pillar  of  the  EU's 
Common Agricultural Policy and brought rural development under a single regulation to apply 
across  the  whole  of  the  European  Union  for  the  period  2000-2006.  Besides  agricultural 
restructuring, it addressed environmental concerns and the wider needs of rural areas. 
Council  regulation  1257/1999  proposed  a  menu  of  22  measures  that  could  be 
implemented by Member States in their Rural Development Programs. In 2003, the mid-term 
review of the CAP added new measures to promote quality and animal welfare, and help for 
farmers to meet new EU standards. The final set of 26 measures can be structured around 3 axes 
addressing  the  broad  issues  of:  agricultural  restructuring,  protecting  the  environment  and 
countryside; and strengthening the local rural economy and rural communities. 
The  mid-term review also led to a strengthening of rural development policy via the 
provision of more EU money for rural development through a reduction in direct payments 
(‘modulation’) for bigger farms. 
The total financial plan for all Rural Development financial instruments amounted to 
around 64.4 bio euros over the period 2000-2006. Agri-environmental measures covered 45% of 
total expenditure, followed by Less Favored Areas support (21%), encouragement of adaptation 
of  rural  areas  (10%),  forestry  measures  (9%),  investment  in  agricultural  holding  -including 
setting-up of young farmers and training- (6%), early retirement scheme (5%), processing and 
marketing of agricultural products (3%) and the others (2%). 
Considerable simplification has been introduced in the new programming period 2007-
2013 as compared to the previous one. Rural Development is now financed by a single fund: the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development. The previous 5 types of programming have 
been reduced to a single one, and there is now a single financial management and control 
framework instead of three.  
The Rural Development policy serves the aims of a) improving the competitiveness of 
agriculture  and  forestry  by  encouraging  farmers  to  structural  changes;  b)  improving  the 
environment and the countryside; c) improving the quality of life in rural areas and encouraging 
diversification of economic activity. 
Emphasis has been put on the potential of Rural development measures to create new 
working places and better working conditions, hence to contribute to the Lisbon strategy of 
growth and jobs. 
An analysis of the DGAGRI (European Commission, 2009) based on 2000-2006 Farm 
Accountancy  Data  Network  (FADN)  data,  inform  us  that  total  RD  support  in  the  EU-25 
corresponds on average to €1337 per Annual Working Unit (AWU) or €61 per ha of Utilized Ancona - 122
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Agricultura Area (UAA). The support granted under the RD policy is equivalent to 22% of 
average ‘first pillar’ direct payments (including national aids). On average in the EU-25, RD 
farm recipients tend to be bigger farms than non-recipients (40 European Size Unit compared to 
31 ESU, 52 ha compared to 24 ha). Their Farm Net Value Added (FNVA) per annual unit of 
labor  (€19436/AWU)  is  similar  to  that  of  non-recipients  (€18303/AWU),  but  their  labor 
profitability is significantly lower, at -€2336/AWU compared to -€179/AWU for non-recipients. 
The total direct support received by RD recipients corresponds to 60% of their FNVA: 
42% from the ‘first pillar’ (€8094/AWU, €264/ha, including national aids) and 18% from the 
‘second pillar’ (€3530/AWU, €115/ha). This means that without any direct support, all other 
things being equal, the amount available to remunerate the production factors of RD recipients 
would otherwise be 60 % lower. In comparison, the direct support received by non-recipients (€ 
4 743/AWU, € 286/ha) represents only 26 % of their FNVA. 
2.2. The first Italian Rural Development Programme 2000-06 
For the implementation of the rural development policy in Italy, 51 different regional 
programmes.  
The Centre-North Regions had one RDP for rural development measures funded mainly 
through  Pillar  2  of  the  CAP.  They  may,  in  principle, contain  all  the  26  rural  development 
measures.  In  the  South,  that  is  in  Objective  1  regions,  the  RDPs  cover  only  the  8 
“accompanying  measures”  (early  retirement,  less  favoured  areas,  agri-environment, 
afforestation of agricultural land, 2 quality measures and 2 meeting standards measures) while 
the remaining “non- accompanying measures” are integrated into the Objective 1 programmes, 
that  is  into  the  Regional  Operational  Programmes  (ROP)  under  the  Community  Support 
Framework.  
 









   
Source: own elaboration 
 
The financial resources of the 49 different Rural Development Programmes were mainly 
concentrated  on  the  measures  aiming  at  enhancing  agricultural  competitiveness    (i.e. Ancona - 122
nd EAAE Seminar 
"Evidence-Based Agricultural and Rural Policy Making” 
Page 5 of 14 
investments  in  agricultural  holdings  (12.6%),  the  setting-up  of  young  farmers  (5.8%), 
improvement of processing and marketing of farm products (6.5%)) and sustainability (i.e. new 
agri-environmental measures (18.5%), compensatory allowances (6.7%). While policy measures 
devoted to measures promoting non agricultural rural development (diversification of economic 
activities, infrastructures and services) covered less than the 10% of total resources (Fig. 1).  
It is also interesting to note the time profile of expenditures and their distribution by 
measure.  In  the  early  years  of the programme  only  a  little amount  of  funds were  used,  in 
addition most of the expenditures were related to the agro-environmental payments (70%) –
mainly due to the continuation of the payment started under the EU Reg. 2078/92. In the last 
two  years  of the  programming  period  the  expenditures  increased  and  at  the  same  time  the 
amount of resources devoted to the agro-environmental payments reduced to 20% of the total 
expenditures.  
According  to  the  OECD  Italian  RD  policy  continued  to:  1)  target  agricultural 
competitiveness as the main priority for spending; 2) result in low quality interventions because 
regions were targeting some measures based on speed of spend; 3) be insufficiently innovative 
in the area of rural economic diversification; 4) limit the potential for scaling-up development 
capacity  and  shared  learning  by  dedicating  relatively  few  resources  to  integrated  rural 
development planning tools (like LEADER and ITPs); 5) lack co-ordination at the regional and 
central levels; and thus 6) lack a discernable rural vision (OECD, 2009c). 
3.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1.  Data  
The analysis is based on a panel of more than 3000 Italian family
2 farms drawn from the 
2003-2007 FADN sample.  
The Italian FADN survey started to be conducted on statistically representative sample 
drawn from the census in 2003. The sample is stratified according to criteria of geographical 
region, economic size (ESU) and farming type (FT). The field of observation is the total of 
commercial farms, that is farms with an economic size greater than 4 ESU (4,800 euro). The 
sample  size  of  each  FADN  wave  is  fixed  at  17,000  farms  (commercial)  by  a  specific  EC 
regulation (Reg. (EC) 60/1997).   
We then extracted a 5 waves balanced panel of farms containing only those holdings for 
which information where collected in both 2003 and 2007.  
Given the available data and the model requirements, the 2003 wave information are used 
to  define  the  pre-treatment  control  variables,  while the  2007  wave  information  are  used  to 
define our outcomes. Finally, the 2004-2007 waves are used to identify farms receiving or not 
the RDP payments. More in detail, in the dataset 341 farms (corresponding to 13.32% of total 
                                                       
 
 
2 We define sole ownership farms  as family farms. This is consistent with what usually done by DGAGRI. Ancona - 122
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observations) received at least a payment from RDP over the 2004-2007 period
3. These farms 
represent  the  treatment  group,  while  farms  not  receiving  RDP  payments  in  the  2004-2007 
period represent the control group.  
Table 1 informs about the descriptive statistics in the sample. 
The inspection of these data reveals that the mean 2003-2007 differences in outcome 
variables of the untreated are lower than in the untreated. More in detail over the period labor 
units, both total and family, employed in treated farms have grown much more than in the 
untreated group. The same kind of consideration applies to corrected value added, i.e. net of 
compensatory allowance received in year 2007. In the case of land, both cropped and total, as 
well as of unitary profits participant farms show in increase in size in contrast to the decrease 
observed in the non participant farms.  
Overall the data give the impression that the participation to RDP has produced positive 
effects in terms of structural change and of economic performance in treated farms.   
                                                       
 
 
3 Some RDP payments are paid for a 5 year period, as a consequence the support granted under the 2000-2006 programme could 
last till 2010. Ancona - 122
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
     Treated (obs. 341)  Untreated (obs. 2220) 
Type  Variables  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
D FAWU  0.077  0.608  0.003  0.592 
D AWU  0.320  2.229  0.153  2.082 
D Labor profitability  301.73  3418.28  -12.26  800.00 
D UAA  0.961  22.152  -0.375  12.460 
D TAA  5.777  74.608  -0.454  14.208 
Outcomes  
(2003-2007) 
D Corrected added value  21039.83  97320.28  3953.16  78770.87 
Age of the operator  1948.90  13.75  1952.68  13.22 
Male operator  0.760  0.428  0.807  0.395 
North-West  0.217  0.413  0.195  0.396 
North-East  0.158  0.366  0.241  0.428 
Centre  0.220  0.415  0.180  0.384 
South  0.279  0.449  0.289  0.453 
Islands  0.126  0.332  0.095  0.294 
Plane  0.196  0.398  0.359  0.480 
ESU < 8  0.161  0.368  0.196  0.397 
FT olive  0.079  0.270  0.071  0.256 
FT wine  0.050  0.218  0.067  0.249 
FT field crops  0.279  0.449  0.374  0.484 
FT fruit and citrus   0.073  0.261  0.095  0.294 
FT livestock  0.229  0.421  0.154  0.361 
Environmental protected areas  0.065  0.246  0.030  0.170 
Covariates  
(2003) 
Pluriactive family  0.079  0.270  0.150  0.357 
Source: own elaboration 
Note: labor profitability is the profit to family labor unit ratio  
3.2.  The model 
We are estimating the causal effect of a payment from RDP on various farms’ outcomes 
(AWU, FAWU, Labor profitability, UAA, TAA and corrected added value). Ideally, we like to 
compare the outcomes of farms participating in RDP (the treatment group) to the same farms 
not participating (the control group) to determine the average treatment effect (ATEj): 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
0 1 0 1 = - = = = - = = D Y E D Y E D Y D Y E ATE j j j j j     (1) 
 
where the subscript j indicates the 2007 outcomes analyzed. (Y
1
j| D=1) is the outcome of 
treated Y
1
j if farm has received a payment (D=1), and (Y
0
j |D=0), the outcome of untreated (Y
0
j) 
if farm has not received a payment from RDP (D=0). 
However, as we can observe each farm only in one state, the outcomes for treated had 
they  not  been  treated  is  an  unobserved  counterfactual.  To  solve  this  puzzle,  micro-
econometricians proposed to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATTj): Ancona - 122
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( ) ( ) ( ) 1 | 1 | 1 |
0 1 0 1 = - = = = - = D Y E D Y E D Y Y E ATT j j j j j       (2) 
 
That is, the mean effect of receiving a payment from RDP rather than not on the farms 
that received a payment from RDP (the impact of treatment on the treated). In any case, Y
0
j 
|D=1 is not observable and, as Becker and Ichino (2002) underlined, since in observational 
studies assignment of subject to the treatment and control groups is not random, the estimation 
of the effect of treatment may be biased because of the existence of confounding factors
4. 
An  unbiased  estimate  of  ATT  can  be  obtained  if  treatment  satisfies  the  Conditional 
Independence Assumption (CIA): 
 
( ) X D Y |
0 ^                   (3) 
 
The outcome of untreated is independent of the treatment conditional on some set of 
observed covariates X. In other words, according to CIA, conditioning on a suitable set of 
covariates, it is possible to remove all systematic differences in outcomes in the untreated state.  
Unfortunately,  there  may  be  systematic  differences  between  treated  and  untreated 
outcomes, even after conditioning on observables, because of unobservable factors and/or level 
differences in outcomes. To solve these problems, Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997) suggest 
a conditional difference-in-difference matching estimator (CDID)
5, for which both before and 
after treatment outcome information is used. Specifically, let t1 represent a time period after the 
treatment start date and t0 a time period before the treatment. The CDID (see Pufahl and Weiss 
2009 for an application) compares the conditional before and after outcomes of treated with 
those of untreated: 
 
( ) ( ) X D Y Y E X D Y Y E t t t t , 0 | , 1 |
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 = - - = -
 
 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), to reduce the estimation bias in the estimation of treatment 
effects with observational data, proposed the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method. PSM 
method has two main advantages when compared with standard econometric techniques. First, 
it preserves us from making strong assumptions on functional form, like linearity and additivity 
of regressors, that characterize standard econometric models. Second, PSM is based on the idea 
that the bias is reduced when the comparison of outcomes is performed using treated and control 
farms who are as similar as possible. This is allowed applying the matching procedure based on 
the propensity score, i.e. the conditional probability of receiving a treatment given pre-treatment 
characteristics: 
                                                       
 
 
4 ATT corresponds to the ATE only if the occurrence of conviction is unrelated to outcomes. 
5 While CDID solves the problem of time-invariant unobservable factors, time variant unobserved heterogeneity possibly remains 
unidentified. Ancona - 122
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( ) ( ) ( ) X D E X D X p | | 1 Pr = = º             (4) 
 
When  observations  with  the  same  propensity  score  have  the  same  distribution  of 
observable characteristics independently of treatment status
6, the balancing property is satisfied
7 
and, hence, the common support condition holds. Moreover, satisfying the balancing property 
means that exposure to treatment may be considered to be random and therefore treated and 
control units should be on average observationally identical (CIA or selection on observables).  
To better examine the common support condition the propensity scores of the examined 
group are plotted in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Propensity score histograms by treatment status. 




Source: own elaboration on FADN data. 
In the graph, the top histogram reports observations that received a payment from RDP, 
while the bottom histogram represents those not receiving a payment from RDP. The horizontal 
axis defines intervals of the propensity score and the height of each bar on the vertical axis 
indicates  the  fraction  of  the  relevant  sample  with  scores  in  the  corresponding  interval. 
                                                       
 
 
6 For a complete discussion on matching methods, see Dehejia and Wahba (2002). 
7 If the balancing property is not satisfied this means that the two groups are too different in terms of observables and additional 
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Fortunately, the figure shows that in all cases the overlapped region is quite wide and it is not 
needed to eliminate a relevant number of observations.   
Obtaining a specification that satisfies the balancing property does not assure us that we 
are credibly addressing the possible “selection on unobservables”. In other words, it means that 
bias generated by unobservable confounding factors could be not completely eliminated. The 
extent to which this bias is reduced depends on the quality and richness of information on which 
the propensity score is computed. We are confident that information available from the RICA 
dataset and that we use quite well satisfy those requirements. 
Matching may be implemented with a variety of different methods. All methods construct 
an estimate of the expected unobserved counterfactual for each treated observation by taking a 
weighted average of the outcomes of the untreated observations. What differs is the specific 
form of the weights. In order to check that our results are not driven by the kind of PSM 
technique chosen, we use two widely used methods that deal very differently with the trade-off 
between bias and variance: Gaussian Kernel Matching and Nearest Neighbor Matching. The 
first is a non-parametric matching estimator that uses weighted averages of all farms in the 
control group to generate the counterfactual outcome. One major advantage of these approaches 
is the smaller variance which is achieved because more information is used. A drawback of 
these methods is that also observations that are bad matches may be used. Gaussian Kernel 
matching can be seen as a weighted regression of the counterfactual outcome on an intercept 
with weights given by the Kernel weights. Weights depend on the distance between each farm 
from the control group and the treated observation for which the counterfactual is estimated (see 
Smith and Todd, 2005). The second method is the most straightforward matching estimator. A 
farm from the comparison group is chosen as a matching partner for a treated farm that is 
closest in terms of propensity score
8.  
4.  MAIN RESULTS 
As well known, PSM technique requires a first step, in which the probability of receiving 
a treatment is estimated with respect to pre-treatment control variables to remove systematic 
differences between treated and untreated observations. In our application of PSM, we first 
fitted a logit regression in which the dependent variable equals one if the farm was treated, i.e. it 
received at least one payment over the 2004-07 period, zero otherwise.  
We tried alternative specifications of the logit model, for example we tried to exploit the 
information about the type of farming (FT) or the regional location of the farm but the balancing 
test  failed.  The  specification  used  in  this  paper  (table  2)  is  the  most  complete  and  robust 
specification that satisfied the balancing property. The logit model correctly classify 87.13% per 
cent of observations.  In general, farms located in environmentally protected area and those 
specialized in breeding animals are more likely to benefit of RDP payments. The probability of 
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participation decreases when the agricultural family is pluriactive, that is when some members 
of the household work off farm, when operators are young and when they are female, when the 
farm is specialized in the production of field crops and when it is located in the plain. 
We then matched participants and non-participant observations by two PSM techniques 
as discussed earlier. The standard errors of the impact estimates are calculated by bootstrap 
using 500 replications for each estimate. 
The estimated average treatment effect on the treated based on two matching algorithms, 
namely  the  Gaussian  Kernel  Matching  (GKM)  method  and  nearest  neighborhood  Matching 
(NNM) method, are reported in table 3. Our analysis reveals that participation in RDP has a 
significant positive causal impact on family labor, while it does not have a significant impact on 
other structural indicators such as total labor units and farm land, either total and cropped. In 
addition, farms that participated in the RDP present a better economic performance than non 
participant farms. It is interesting to note that in the case of corrected value added, i.e. net of 
RDP payments, the average treatment effect on the treated is significant in the case of the CDID 
estimator based on the GKM while it is not significant in the case of NNM. This difference is 
possibly due to the less information used in the first method. In previous paragraphs we already 
mentioned that NNM is the most straightforward matching estimator, as a consequence the 
signal given by this estimator may be more reliable than the one produced by the GKM.  
Finally, the increase in unitary profits is positive and significant both in the case of the 
estimator based on the Gaussian kernel matching and that of the nearest neighbor matching. 
More in detail, this variable measures the family farm income per unit of family labor, where 
the family farm income is obtained by deducting from added value the remunerations paid to 
external factor, hence it is the sum of wages, rent paid and cost of own factors (labor, land and 
capital). In other words, the ratio informs of the hypothetical remuneration/earning distributed 
to the family member participating to the farm work under the assumption of linear distribution 
of total family farm income.  Ancona - 122
nd EAAE Seminar 
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Table 2: results of the logit regression 
   Coeff.  Std. Err.    
Age of the operator  -0.021  0.005  *** 
Sex of the operator  -0.264  0.144  * 
North-West  -0.193  0.217   
North-East  -0.504  0.233  ** 
Centre  -0.264  0.217   
South  -0.477  0.207  ** 
Plane  -0.787  0.155  *** 
ESU < 8  -0.224  0.167   
FT olive  -0.026  0.244   
FT wine  -0.459  0.285   
FT field crops  -0.518  0.160  *** 
FT citrus   -0.334  0.250   
FT livestock  0.108  0.172   
Environmental protected areas  0.808  0.263  *** 
Pluriactivity  -0.622  0.216  *** 
Intercept  40.419  8.945  *** 
Number of obs  2561 
LR chi2(15)  114.86 
Prob > chi2  0.000 
Pseudo R2  0.057 
Log likelihood  -959.82 
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
Table 3: Average Treatment Ettect (ATT) of the treated 
   Gaussian Kernel Matching   Nearest Neighbour Matching  
ATT  Std. Err.  t  ATT  Std. Err.  t 
D FAWU 
0.066  0.036  1.830  0.034  0.056  0.604 
D  AWU  0.148  0.124  1.186  0.024  0.198  0.120 
D  Labor profitability  324.392  179.246  1.810  314.846  189.233  1.664 
D  UAA  1.249  1.174  1.063  1.415  1.598  0.886 
D  TAA  6.144  4.239  1.449  6.344  4.011  1.582 
D  Corrected added value  17643.697  5821.995  3.031  11911.344  8789.928  1.355 
Source: own elaboration 
5.  CONCLUSIVE REMARKS  
The  interest  in  impact  assessment  of  agricultural  and  rural  development  policies  is 
growing partly due to the increasing competition on the use of diminishing public funds. 
Under these circumstances it becomes important to evaluate the effectiveness as well as 
the net impact of policies on relevant or targeted variables. 
A key issue in policy evaluation is the establishment of a baseline or counter-factual 
scenario to determine “additionality”, i.e. the additional net impact that specific policy measures 
have variables of interest.  Ancona - 122
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PSM can provide a tool to identify whether significant and causal differences in outcome 
variables occur between farms receiving or not RD support.  
In the case of participation in the first Italian RDP, the comparison of mean differences in 
outcome variables of treated against non treated farms suggests payments have produced the 
expected results. Namely, the support favored structural change and improved the economic 
performance in participant farms in respect to what happened in non participant farms. More in 
detail, on average, labor units, both total and family, employed in treated farms have grown 
much more than in the untreated group. The same kind of considerations applies to corrected 
added value, i.e. added value net of compensatory allowance received in year 2007. In addition, 
land, both cultivated and total, as well labor profitability in participant farms have shown an 
increase in contrast to the decrease observed in non participant farms.  
The  ex-post  evaluation  of  the  effectiveness  of  RD  policy  in  meeting  the  targeted 
objectives is less optimistic when we analyse the causal impact on outcome variables after 
removing all systematic differences in outcomes in the untreated state. When we look at the 
conditional difference-in-difference matching estimator of the average treatment effect on the 
treated, that is when we take into account the effect of both observables and unobservable 
factors  affecting  the  differences  in  outcomes,  we  find  that  farms  participating  in  the  RDP 
increased the number of family labor units employed on farm, while no significant changes have 
been estimated in the case of total labor units. These results suggest that family labor has been 
substituted to external labor force. In other words, the participation in RDP did not produce an 
impact on rural employment, or at least it did not create a direct impact on this variable. In 
contrast, participation in RDP appears to have been effective in terms of GDP growth in rural 
areas, or at least the direct impact, that is the impact on the growth of agricultural added value, 
appears to be positive.   
Overall, it appears that the net impacts on on-farm emplyment estimated through the 
conditional  difference-in-difference  matching  approach  are  much  lower  than  the  impact 
suggested by the comparison of simple means.  
As for economic performance, the difference-in-difference matching approach confirms 
treated  farms  perform  better,  either  in  terms  of  value  added  or  of  unitary  profits,  of  non 
participant farms. These results suggest that farms participating in RDP in order to improve 
their economic sustainability used cost reduction strategies. In future work it could be of interest 
to analize if the substitution of family to off-farm labor can be interpreted as a form of self-
exploitation (accepting returns to owned labour and land lower than the market wage and rent) 
to cope with external economic pressures and survive economic crisis. 
Given  we  seek  to  identify  the  causal  effect  of  treatment  after  only  few  years  from 
implementation, our study is a short term impact evaluation of the Rd policy. Our future work 
could go in several directions. A natural extension is to update the analysis in order to capture 
the long standing effect of RD policy. In addition, we intend to disentangle the causal impact of 
specific  policy  measures  contained  in  the  RD  plans  such  as,  for  example,  single  agri-Ancona - 122
nd EAAE Seminar 
"Evidence-Based Agricultural and Rural Policy Making” 
Page 14 of 14 
environmental measures. A further direction of research is to enlarge the set outcome variables 
to evaluate the enviromental impact of specific policy measures. 
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